by Brian Bosse, Copyright March 31, 2008, all rights reserved. 34 views
It is now time to explain what Middle Knowledge (MK) is relative to Natural Knowledge (NK) and Free Knowledge (FK). There are two characteristics we are going to use to describe these three types of knowledge. They are 'volitional' and 'necessary'.
Volitional
Volitional knowledge is that knowledge of God whose foundation is found in the will of God. In other words, God knows 'X' volitionally precisely because God wills 'X'. For example, God knows the proposition, "Brian Bosse exists." This knowledge is due to God's will (choice) to create Brian Bosse. As such, this knowledge is volitional. All FK is volitional. On the other hand, all NK is pre-volitional. The laws of logic would be an example of knowledge that is pre-volitional. The law of non-contradiction does not find its foundation in the will of God, but rather in the very nature of God. These laws are a reflection of who God is in His thinking. As such, they exist because God exists, and not because God chose to create them.
Necessary
All NK is necessary knowledge because it is based upon the existence of God who is a necessary being. However, the assumption made by proponents of Middle Knowledge (and most theologians in general) is that God's choice to create is not necessary. That is to say, God could have chosen not to create or could have chosen to create some other possible world. As such FK is not necessary. Rather, it is contingent - contingent upon God's will to create.
Middle Knowledge
NK can be characterized as pre-volitional and necessary. FK can be characterized as volitional and contingent. Middle Knowledge (MK) can be characterized as pre-volitional (like NK) and contingent (like FK). It is a knowledge that is between NK and FK. That is why it is called MK. It is in the middle of NK and FK. Because it is pre-volitional it is independent of God's will.
So, what are the objects of this knowledge? Dr. John Laing describes it this way:
"The doctrine of middle knowledge proposes that God has knowledge of metaphysically necessary states of affairs via natural knowledge, of what He intends to do via free knowledge, and in addition, of what free creatures would do if they were instantiated (via middle knowledge). Thus, the content of middle knowledge is made up of truths which refer to what would be the case if various states of affairs were to obtain. For example, the statement, 'If John Laing were given the opportunity to write an article on middle knowledge for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he would freely do so,' although true, is certainly not necessarily so. I could easily have refrained from writing, if I were so inclined (or too busy, etc.). Likewise, its truth does not seem to be dependent upon God's will in the same way that 'John Laing exists' is. Even if God chose to not create me, the statement regarding my writing the article could still be true. In fact, its truth does not seem to be dependent upon God's will at all, but rather upon my will. One of the basic assumptions of the doctrine of middle knowledge outlined above is that God cannot will a creature to freely choose anything. Thus, the content of middle knowledge can be thought of as including a virtually infinite number of propositions of the form, If person, P, were in situation, S, then P would freely perform action, A."[1]
The idea is that God can look at these truths of counterfactuals of freedom, which are truths about the actions of free creatures, and His actualizing a possible world where these truths are actualized does not violate libertarian freedom. For example, let's say the following proposition is a counterfactual of freedom…
P: If Brian were in situation X, then he will freely choose to write about Molinism.
Notice, the consequence of this conditional statement that I would choose to write about Molinism is that I would do so in a free manner. That is to say, if God wanted me to write about Molinism all He would need to do was put me in situation X, and I would so freely! So, God knows 'P' as part of His MK, and then if He wills that I write about Molinism (FK), He actuates the world that puts me in situation X. God's will is done and His sovereignty is maintained while my freedom is left intact.
This is the essence of Middle Knowledge and Molinism. However, I think it is incoherent within the framework of possible world theory. I developed my argument for this through a series of email exchanges with Dr. Laing over the summer of 2007. He has gracious allowed me to share this exchange noting that his responses were "off the cuff and not as well thought out as a published article would be."
[1] Dr. John Laing, Middle Knowledge, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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