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Middle Knowledge (Molinism) VI

by Brian Bosse, Copyright April 03, 2008, all rights reserved. 56 views

The definition for Libertarian Free Will (LFW) in terms of possible world semantics is as follows:

Defintion (LFW): Person A performs action X given circumstance C with Libertarian freedom if and only if it is possible that person A can perform action ¬X given circumstance C.

Now, let's raise a possible objection. Consider the denial of Christ by Peter. If Peter's action is free in the libertarian sense, then there exists a possible world where everything is exactly the same with the exception of Peter's denial. The problem with this is that the "everything is exactly the same" includes the prediction by Jesus that Peter would deny Him three times. In other words, if Peter's denial is truly free, then there exists a possible world where Jesus falsely predicts that Peter will deny Him three times!

Someone might argue that possible events are only those events that logically cohere. Since Jesus, who is infallible, predicted that Peter would deny Him three times, then the event of Peter not denying Jesus does not logically cohere and as such is not a possible world. This would leave intact Jesus' infallibility, but then it removes Peter's libertarian freedom regarding his denial of Christ. I do not know how the Libertarian can overcome this objection. Now, one defense concerning this very critique is given as follows…

If God believed at time t1 that Peter would deny Christ at time t2, then if Peter really could have not denied Christ, then at least one of three consequences results:

(1) It was within Peter's power at time t2 to do something that would bring about God having a false belief.
(2) It was within Peter's power at time t2 to change God's belief at t1.
(3) It was within Peter's power at time t2 to make it such that any person who believed that Peter would deny Christ at time t1 held a false belief.

All three of these possible consequences are very problematic. Alvin Plantinga (a famous Christian philosopher) argues that we possess a type of "power over the past" that does not entail the ability to change past events by retro-causation. That is, we have counterfactual power over the past. In other words, Alvin Plantinga argues for (2) above in some sense. Consider the proposition: "God believes at time t1 that Peter will deny Christ at time t2." If LFW is true, then at time t2 Peter must be able to not deny Christ. According to Plantinga, Peter can refrain from denying Christ, and if he were to do so, then God would have always foreknown that Peter would not deny Christ. It is de facto true that Peter will deny Christ, but had he done otherwise, God's past knowledge would always have been different, and Jeus would not have made the prediction. Essentially, what is being stated is the following:

P1: If Peter does A at t2, then God's knowledge at t1 is K.

and

P2: If Peter does ¬A at t2, then God's knowledge at t1 is ¬K.

It is like saying whatever happens God knew it would happen. Plantinga refers to this situation as "counterfactual power over God's knowledge, " and he claims this "power over the past" does not entail retro-causation. Rather, it is the power to assert the truth of various backtracking counterfactuals. Frankly, this answer seems absurd. Dr. Laing in a correspondence dated 6/17/07 called it a weak position or claim. However, Alvin Plantinga is much smarter than I am. As such, I probably do not fully understand the argument, or am missing a key component. Therefore, I will leave this as it is, and if I learn more, then I will pick it back up.

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
PartV

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