Van Tillian Presuppositional Apologetics – A Critique Concerning Certainty

By Brian Bosse

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**Introduction**

This paper is an analysis of the claim that presuppositional apologetics in the Van Tillian tradition\(^1\) provides an objectively certain proof for the existence of the Christian God. The conclusion reached is that there is an inductive element crucial to the method, and as such it does not provide objective certainty. The presentation will be broken up into four sections:

**Section 1: Van Til’s Apologetic Method**

**Section 2: An Argument Against Certainty\(^2\)**

**Section 3: Dr. Greg Bahnsen’s Rebuttal \(^3\)**

**Section 4: Final Comments**

**Section 1: Van Til’s Apologetic Method**

The following is a formalization of the presuppositional apologetic as espoused by Dr. Van Til. He says, “Since on the Reformed basis there is no area of neutrality between the believer and the unbeliever, the argument between them must be *indirect.*” \(^4\) According to Dr.

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\(^1\) Dr. Cornelies Van Til (1895-1987) was the head of the apologetics department at Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania from 1929-1972. Many consider him the father of presuppositional apologetics. The distinction concerning Van Tillian apologetics is made so as not to confuse it with other “presuppositionalists” such as Gordon H. Clark. Therefore, any reference to presuppositional apologetics in this paper should be understood in the Van Tillian tradition.

\(^2\) Even though this paper argues against the claim of an objectively certain proof, the presuppositional apologetic argument does provide a rationally justified basis upon which to adopt the Christian worldview.

\(^3\) Dr. Greg Bahnsen (1948-1995) was one of the most important representatives of this apologetic method. He was a student of Van Til, and often lectured on behalf of Van Til at Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia.

\(^4\) Bahnsen, *Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings & Analysis* (Philipsburg, New Jersey: P&R Publishing, ©1998 by the Cornelius Van Til Committee), pg. 485. (Italics found in original.)
Van Til, the argument being presented must be an indirect argument. The indirect argument form is technically referred to as the *Reductio Ad Absurdum* (RAA) proof. Here is an example of this argument form being used to prove the proposition A:

1. Assume the contradictory of A, i.e., \( \neg A \).
2. From \( \neg A \), a set of formal consequences is deduced, say

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\neg A \rightarrow B_1 \rightarrow B_2 \rightarrow B_3 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow B(k),
\]

for which we already know that \( \neg B(k) \) is an authentic truth, thereby establishing a purposeful contradiction between \( B(k) \) and \( \neg B(k) \).

3. Based on the law of non-contradiction \( B(k) \) is concluded to be authentically false.
4. Based on the logical law of *Modus Tollens* the assumption \( \neg A \) is concluded to be authentically false.
5. By the law of negation, if \( \neg A \) is false, then A is true.

The key point of an indirect proof is deriving a contradiction between a formal (inauthentic) consequence of the assumption and an independently authentic true statement such as an earlier proved theorem, axiom, or agreed upon necessary position. Only from this kind of

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5 In a lecture titled, “A Summary of Transcendental Arguments – Part 2,” Dr. Bahnsen notes that there are two types of proof the apologist is able to present: (1) Indirect, and (2) Proof by Dilemma. He says that technically (2) is the same thing as (1). Bahnsen, *Transcendental Arguments*, Lecture 7, [www.cmfnow.com](http://www.cmfnow.com).

6 The assumption of the contradiction of what is being proved is what makes this proof an indirect proof. One assumes the opposite of what is being proved, and from this a contradiction is derived (i.e., the position is reduced to absurdity), thereby negating the assumption and establishing what was set out to be proved. The symbol ‘ \( \neg \)’ stands for negation.
contradiction is the authentic falsehood of the inauthentic consequence deduced, and only from this is the falsehood of the assumption deduced by the rule of *Modus Tollens*. The truth of the theorem is deduced from the proved falsehood of the assumption. The logical form of this is…

**Prove:** A

**Step 1:** Assume $\neg A$

**Step 2:** $\neg A \rightarrow B$

**Step 3:** $\neg B$  (Note: $\neg B$ is an independently authentic truth.)

**Step 4:** $\neg \neg A$  (*Modus Tollens* on steps 2 & 3.)

**Step 5:** A  (The law of negation.)

Q.E.D.

Based on this examination of the logical form of an indirect proof and Van Til’s assertion that the presuppositionalist *must* argue indirectly, one may conclude that the presuppositional apologetic argument is of this logical form.\(^7\)

The next step is to determine what the actual propositions are that make up this indirect argument. Dr. Bahnsen, in a lecture titled “Epistemological Issues: Foundationalism and Certainty,”\(^8\) appeals to an article on the subject of doubt written by Harry G. Frankfurt.\(^9\) In this article Dr. Frankfurt writes, “The claim that a basis for doubt is inconceivable is justified

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\(^7\) It should be noted, that all indirect arguments can be stated in direct terms. For instance, the contrapositive of step 2 is $\neg B \rightarrow A$. If our independently authentic truth is $\neg B$, then by the logical law of *Modus Ponens* ‘A’ follows immediately. From a logical perspective, the only reason to use an indirect argument over its direct counterpart would be that in some cases it is easier to establish $\neg A \rightarrow B$ than it is to establish $\neg B \rightarrow A$. My opinion is that Van Til understood this, and was rather making another point as to why the apologetic method must be indirect. He was making the point that the believer and unbeliever are coming from two epistemologically antithetical positions, and as such there is no common ground. As such, he proposes to do an analysis of both positions from within their respective worldviews in an effort to demonstrate the truth of Christianity. Van Til considers this approach to be indirect argumentation. The details of this argument will be expanded upon later in this paper. Nevertheless, the above formal argument does capture the essence of the general presuppositional argument form.

\(^8\) Bahnsen, *Seminary Course in Apologetics*, Lecture 17, delivered in Brooklyn, New York, [www.cmfnow.com](http://www.cmfnow.com).

\(^9\) Professor Emeritus – Princeton Department of Philosophy.
whenever a denial of the claim would violate the conditions or presuppositions of rational inquiry...since inquiry is fundamentally an attempt to discriminate between what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected, nothing can rationally be conceived which involves denying the necessity for making these discriminations or undermining the possibility of making them."\(^{10}\)

Dr. Frankfurt argues that any denial of a claim which would lead to the destruction of rational inquiry provides certain proof for the claim. Dr. Bahnsen’s appeal to this argument in support of the apologetic method indicates that the Van Tillian presuppositional apologetic method is an attempt to demonstrate that the Christian God is the necessary precondition for rational inquiry. Accordingly, if the Christian God is the necessary precondition for rational inquiry, then this provides certain proof for God’s existence because denying the Christian God’s existence would undermine the very possibility for rational inquiry itself. The following can be inferred from this analysis:

(1) The independently authentic truth of the RAA argument (Step 3) is rational inquiry itself. That is to say, the presuppositionalist asserts that we all must be rational.

In regards to the skeptic, rational inquiry is presupposed by anyone making an inquiry into the truth claims of Christianity. If this is not presupposed, then the person making the inquiry has no basis upon which to make the inquiry.

(2) The formal inauthentic consequence of the assumption (step 2) will be that without the Christian God rational inquiry is not possible. In other words, if we deny the Christian God, then the apologist will argue we have denied the very foundation that makes rational inquiry possible.

Based on these two points, Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic argument can be formulated as follows:

**Prove A:** The Triune God of Christianity exists.

**Step 1:** The Triune God of Christianity does not exist (assume \( \neg A \)).

**Step 2:** If the Triune God of Christianity does not exist, then rational inquiry is not possible (\( \neg A \rightarrow B \)).

**Step 3:** Rational inquiry is possible (\( \neg B \)).

**Step 4:** It is not the case that the Triune God of Christianity does not exist (\( \neg \neg A \)).

**Step 5:** The Triune God of Christianity exists (A).

Q.E.D.

This is a valid proof whose key element is step 2. The whole proof hinges on the Christian apologist’s ability to not only demonstrate the assertion in step 2, but to do so in an objectively certain manner. Skeptics might object to step 3 as well. However, as was argued above, this ultimately is irrational because the skeptic’s inquiry itself presupposes rational inquiry. As such, step 3 is granted as the independently authentic truth both sides must accept.

So, how does the apologist establish step 2? Dr. Bahnsen states, “This is a synopsis of the ‘indirect’ or two-step apologetical procedure that presuppositional apologetics advocates. The first step is to lay out the Christian worldview in terms of which human experience is
intelligible and the objection of the unbeliever can be contextually defeated. The second step is to show that within the unbeliever’s worldview, nothing is intelligible – not even objections to the Christian’s viewpoint.”

This amounts to the following two-fold process: (1) A positive argument demonstrating that the Christian worldview can account for rational inquiry and contextually defeat the objections of the unbeliever; and (2) An internal critique of the opposing worldview demonstrating its inability to make such an account.

Section 2: An Argument Against Certainty

The claim of objective certainty is a high claim indeed. This kind of certainty is nothing short of absolute. There can be no possibility of the contrary. To illustrate this consider the following question: What is the date of someone’s birth? Is this answer known with certainty? Is it possible that someday one might find out that the date on the birth certificate was typed incorrectly, and the actual date of birth was the prior day? If this is possible (and it is), then one cannot have certain knowledge of their birth date. What is required of an apologist who claims to have an objectively certain proof for God’s existence? The minimum requirement is a properly applied deductive argument whose premises are all established in a certain manner. Consider the formalization of the presuppositional apologetic proof for the existence of God. It is as follows…

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11 Bahnsen, *Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings & Analysis*, pg. 268, Note 22.
12 This two-fold process is the indirect method of argumentation that Van Til says must be the apologetic approach. See footnote 7 above for clarification.
**Prove:** God exists.

**Step 1:** (assume) God does not exist.
**Step 2:** If God does not exist, then rational inquiry is not possible.
**Step 3:** Rational inquiry is possible.
**Step 4:** It is not the case that God does not exist.
**Step 5:** God exists.

Q.E.D.

The RAA proof method is a valid deductive proof method. Is the proof presented above such a proof? At first, one might answer yes; however, in a debate with R.C. Sproul over apologetic methods, Dr. Bahnsen argues that even the simplest deductive proofs do not provide philosophical certainty because as fallible human beings we can always make mistakes in our application of the laws of logic.\(^\text{13}\) Dr. Bahnsen’s critique is a critique dealing with the form of the argument, and seems to refute the claim that presuppositional apologetics provides objective certain proof. Clearly, the RAA proof method is a deductive argument form that one might misapply.\(^\text{14}\)

This objection illustrates how difficult it is to provide an objectively certain proof. If there is even the slightest possibility that the laws of logic were misapplied, then the argument cannot be said to be certain. Granted, very few would claim that the above proof is something other than a valid RAA proof. However, the possibility that one is misapplying the laws of logic does exist even if it is very low. If someone wants to make the claim of certainty, then they must

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\(^{14}\) The presuppositionalist might object by claiming that his argument is not a deductive argument, but rather is transcendental. However, even if the transcendental argument were a separate argument type, its form is still a deductive argument. What makes transcendental argumentation different from other standard arguments is not its form, but rather the subject of the propositions and its scope. Therefore, the argument is subject to Dr. Bahnsen’s critique, which is a critique dealing with form rather than content or scope.
go beyond the “very likely,” and establish “impossible not to be otherwise.” At this point, the proof fails right out of the blocks, but most would not find this objection to be too severe. Yet, there are bigger hurdles that need to be cleared – one of which we will deal with next.

Establishing step 2 is absolutely critical for the proof, and it must be established in an objectively certain manner for the proof to be considered certain. To do this one must show that the existence of the Christian God is a necessary precondition for rational inquiry. Such preconditions include uniformity, causation, continuity of identity over time, the laws of logic, etc…. If any particular worldview cannot account for these things, then it is reasonable to conclude that the worldview fails to supply the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry.

However, establishing that any particular worldview does provide all the necessary preconditions is not so easy, especially when you do not have a general theory of knowledge, which itself must be objectively certain, that spells out what these preconditions are. The presuppositionalist does not have such a list of preconditions, nor does he present such a list in his apologetic. This presents the second difficulty regarding the claim to certainty.

The presuppositionalist may want to argue that according to his worldview the Christian worldview does provide the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry, and that no other worldviews do. However, upon this appeal, his proof becomes a vicious circle: the Christian worldview is true because it provides the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry, and we know the Christian worldview provides these necessary preconditions because the Christian worldview is true.
How does the presuppositional apologist actually argue that the Christian God is the necessary precondition for rational inquiry? The apologist attempts to establish this using the two-fold process mentioned above. I list it here again:

(1) A positive argument for Christianity in that it can account for rational inquiry.
(2) An internal critique of the opposing worldview demonstrating its inability to account for the preconditions for rational inquiry.

In presuppositional apologetic practice, usually one worldview is pitted against the Christian worldview. The presuppositionalist demonstrates the failure of the competing worldview to account for some precondition of rational inquiry (2), and shows that the Christian worldview can account for it (1). As we noted above, more is required of the apologist to establish that the Christian worldview accounts for all of the preconditions of rational inquiry.

However, even if it was granted that the apologist succeeded in (1), he still fails to establish in an objectively certain manner the key proposition of the RAA proof. All that happens in (2) above is that the apologist takes down one worldview at a time. He never demonstrates that there are no other worldviews that meet the necessary preconditions for knowledge. He only shows that the one he is looking at, and perhaps all of the ones he is aware of, cannot provide the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry. One is only left with the truth of the claim based on the worldviews so far analyzed. It is from this basis that the apologist inductively concludes that all worldviews outside Christianity fail! Therefore, in practice, the
justification for step 2 ends up being an inductive argument, and the proof therefore loses its’ logically necessity. This is the third criticism, and is certainly the most serious.

This ends the argument against the idea that Van Tillian presuppositionalism provides an objectively certain proof for the existence of God. The remainder of this paper will analyze the attempt of Dr. Greg Bahnsen to overcome this third and most serious criticism.

**Section 3: Dr. Greg Bahnsen’s Rebuttal**

As has been illustrated above, the key proposition that must be established by the apologist is:

*If God does not exist, then rational inquiry is not possible.*

In the last section it was noted that the apologist does not establish this in an absolute manner, but rather does so inductively by taking down one worldview at a time. This causes the proof to lose its logical necessity, and consequently the apologist can no longer claim to have an objectively certain proof. Dr. Bahnsen has provided an objection to this very argument, which will now be analyzed.

Dr. Bahnsen lays out the apologetic method described above as follows, “Within the Christian worldview, knowledge…but can be affirmed and made intelligible. But when we ‘for

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15 Dr. Bahnsen’s rebuttal is taken from Bahnsen, *Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings & Analysis*, pg. 487-489.
arguments sake’ look into the character and consequences of non-Christian philosophies, we encounter the repeated epistemological failure of unbelief. Christianity is therefore epistemologically necessary; that is, it must be true because of the impossibility of the contrary.”

Herein is found a description of the presuppositionalist’s argument in support of the key proposition. One will notice that the justification of the key proposition is broken down into 2 parts…

(1) Knowledge can be affirmed and made intelligible within the Christian worldview.
(2) Non-Christian philosophies all end up in epistemological failure.

These two parts are the same two parts mentioned above with one slight variation. In the initial representation, part 2 was represented in terms of looking at one worldview at a time. However, here is found the general statement that all non-Christian philosophies fail. The argument is that since the Christian worldview “works,” and all other worldviews fail, then the Christian worldview is established in an objectively certain manner. However, as has already been argued, the claim that the Christian worldview “works” while all non-Christian worldviews fail is not demonstrated in an objectively certain manner. Continuing, Dr. Bahnsen’s argues, “In the argument between Christian faith and unbelief, it is important to remember that the two positions are mutually exclusive: one submits to the authority of God’s revelation; the other asserts human autonomy.”

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16 Bahnsen, *Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings & Analysis*, pg. 487.
17 Ibid., pg. 487.
At this point, Dr. Bahnsen makes an important distinction between the Christian worldview and all non-Christian worldviews. He says that all non-Christian worldviews assert human autonomy. If Dr. Bahnsen were able to establish this claim, and was also able to establish that any worldview that asserts human autonomy ends up in epistemological failure, then his argument would be established. At this point, these claims are merely asserted.

Dr. Bahnsen continues, “Despite the variety of unbelieving philosophical positions, there are fundamentally only two options…Van Til noted, ‘We have constantly sought to bring out that all forms of atheistic thinking can be reduced to one.’ It would be incorrect, then, to conceive of Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic as an inductive project to find and then refute every ‘imaginable’ alternative to Christianity – every single variation, past or future, on the worldview of autonomous reasoning.”\(^{18}\)

Dr. Bahnsen clearly wants to deal with the objection raised in this paper. Van Til’s use of “atheistic thinking” should not be confused with the general distinction between theistic and non-theistic beliefs. Rather, Van Til is using the term in the sense of all non-Christian worldviews, both theistic and atheistic. Dr. Van Til and Dr. Bahnsen are fundamentally dividing the set of all worldviews into two categories: Christianity, which submits to God as its authority, and the rest who all have in common “autonomous reasoning.”

At the heart of Dr. Bahnsen’s rebuttal is the idea of the commonality of all non-Christian philosophies. He claims that all non-Christian philosophies set aside Christianity, and are

\(^{18}\) Ibid., pg. 487.
ultimately based in human autonomy. Dr. Bahnsen goes on to say, “Either the living or true God is a person’s philosophical point of reference and final authority, or in some fashion man…takes over that position and function. Despite ‘family squabbles’ and secondary deviations among unregenerate men in their thinking, they are united at the basic level in setting aside the Christian conception of God.”\(^\text{19}\)

Again, if Dr. Bahnsen were able to establish this claim, and also able to establish that any worldview asserting human autonomy ends up in epistemological failure, then his argument would be established. Dr. Bahnsen begins by making the following point, “Now then, since the dialogue between the believer and the unbeliever assumes the meaningfulness of their words and the intelligibility of their reasoning, the unbeliever either (1) implicitly assumes the Christian’s presuppositions, (2) considers it a mystery that not everything is mysterious or nonsensical, or (3) offers a worldview in which his words and reasoning are meaningful.”\(^\text{20}\)

Regarding (1), Dr. Bahnsen is assuming that the Christian worldview is a worldview where knowledge is possible. Concerning (2), this is a deathblow to any worldview. It is basically a concession speech on the order of, “I don’t know why there is rationality. I can’t account for it.” And finally there is (3) – the burden of unbelieving worldview to account for intelligibility, which Dr. Bahnsen claims always fails. He says, “If he (the unbeliever) attempts (3), the apologist proceeds to reduce his autonomous outlook to absurdity. If the unbeliever realizes this absurdity, he may try and try again, but in each case the apologist redoubles his

\(^{19}\) Ibid., pgs. 488-489.  
\(^{20}\) Ibid., pgs. 487-488, footnote 41.
effort and again reduces autonomy to absurdity. Eventually the unbeliever should get the point and recognize that his efforts always fail because they presuppose human autonomy.”

Once again we see the part of the apologetic where an internal critique of the opposing worldview takes place demonstrating its inability to justify rational inquiry. Dr. Bahnsen writes, “If the unbeliever realizes this absurdity, he may try and try again, but in each case the apologist redoubles his effort and again reduces autonomy to absurdity.”

Clearly then, in terms of how this apologetic is practiced, Dr. Bahnsen indicates that in a particular encounter, only one case of unbelieving thought is dealt with at a time; however, the apologist does not demonstrate to the unbeliever that all cases of unbelieving thought end up in absurdity, but rather only the one that is presented ends up that way.

Dr. Bahnsen once again asserts that what all of these unbelieving worldviews have in common is that they “presuppose human autonomy” and this is the reason they all fail. His key points are still only assertions, and have not yet been demonstrated. If Dr. Bahnsen were able to demonstrate these key points in an objectively certain manner, then he would succeed. Sadly, these points are never established in such a manner.

We continue with Dr. Bahnsen, “Alternatively, he (the unbeliever) may make an admittedly ‘blind leap of faith’ and hold out the hope that someday, somewhere, someone will furnish an adequate autonomous worldview to protect unbelievers against the compelling

\[\text{Ibid., pg. 488, footnote 41.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., pg. 488, footnote 41.}\]
rationality of Christianity – in which case he has reverted to position (2) and loses anyway.”

This addresses the case where the unbeliever might appeal to a yet untested or unknown worldview that might meet the conditions of both rationality and autonomy.

Once again, Dr. Bahnsen is asserting that even these worldviews will all be autonomous, thus rendering them incapable of rationality. Clearly, if an unbeliever makes this kind of arbitrary appeal, it really amounts to an acknowledged defeat. It is arbitrary. However, why point out that this reverts to position (2)? For if all possible worldviews are necessarily autonomous, and if there really is an objective certain proof for this, then all the apologist need to do is produce the proof, and there would be no basis for any unbeliever ever to appeal to (2). He would be forced to accept (1).

This brings to light an even stronger objection in the same vein. If there were an objectively certain proof, then there would be no reason for the apologist to take down multiple worldviews in an apologetic encounter. There would be no reason to even know what the worldview of the unbeliever was. There would be no reason to present an indirect argument in the Van Tillian sense. All the apologist would need to do is present his proof that all non-Christian worldviews are always autonomous, and that autonomy always leads to irrationality. No more could be said. If the unbeliever wants to be rational, then he would be forced to accept (1). Thus, the actual practice of the apologist militates against his claim of having an objectively certain proof.

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23 Ibid., pg. 488, footnote 41.
Dr. Bahnsen merely restates the same “crucial point” saying all non-Christian worldviews are based on human autonomy. He says, “The kind of necessity for which presuppositional apologetics argues is transcendental or inherent in the arguing itself (showing that the precondition to intelligibility makes any unbelieving argument impossible), not a matter of exhaustively eliminating unbelieving worldviews (all of which share the critical point of presumed autonomy).”

However, no argument establishing any of these points has been forth coming. This leads to the final paragraph of Dr. Bahnsen’s rebuttal where he says, “Similar replies would be appropriate, mutatis mutandis, for David Hoover (‘For the Sake of Argument,’ 4, 8-9), who thinks that ‘discursive finitude’ (lack of omniscience) would preclude ‘a finite human intellect’ from ‘achieving the perspective necessary to run an argument of such great consequence.’ That is, presuppositional argumentation might show that Christianity is a sufficient condition for rationality, uniformity, etc., but it cannot show Christianity to be a necessary condition.”

David Hoover’s objection is related to the third critique of this paper. However, instead of claiming that presuppositional apologetics cannot demonstrate that Christianity is a necessary precondition for knowledge as Hoover argues, this paper merely points out that it has not yet done so. To this Dr. Bahnsen responds, “However, it has never been held (from Kant onward) that a transcendental argument establishes necessity only by the exhaustive elimination of all real

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24 Ibid., pg. 488, footnote 41.
25 Latin for “with necessary changes.”
26 Ibid., pg. 488, footnote 41.
and imaginary *ways of expressing* the alternative (of which there is logically only one: the conclusion’s negation).”

This is the extent of Dr. Bahnsen’s argument on pages 487-489 dealing with the charge that presuppositional apologetics does not provide certainty. The last quote is just a restatement that we have really only two worldviews. Of course, this was never demonstrated.

**Section 4: Final Comments**

The presuppositionalist claims to provide an objectively certain proof for the existence of God. Dr. Bahnsen’s argument is as follows:

**Premise 1:** All non-Christian worldviews are worldviews based on human autonomy.

**Premise 2:** All worldviews based on human autonomy are worldviews that cannot provide a sufficient condition for rational inquiry.

**Premise 3:** The Christian worldview is a worldview that provides a sufficient condition for rational inquiry.

**Conclusion:** The Christian worldview is necessary for rational inquiry.

If all non-Christian worldviews fail to provide a sufficient condition for rational inquiry because they are based on human autonomy, and if the Christian worldview is a worldview that provides a sufficient condition for rational inquiry, then it follows that only the Christian worldview provides a sufficient condition for rational inquiry. By definition, this makes the

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27 Ibid., pg. 488, footnote 41.
Christian worldview *necessary* for rational inquiry. However, Dr. Bahnsen fails to establish the above three premises in an objectively certain manner merely asserting that they are so. Using Dr. Bahnsen’s own words, “Assertion is not proof.” Based on this, Van Tillian apologetics fails to provide an objectively certain proof for God’s existence.\(^{28}\)

\(^{28}\) As the reader may have noticed, the majority of Dr. Bahnsen’s rebuttal to my argument was taken from one lengthy footnote in *Van Til’s Apologetic – Readings & Analysis*. It may be that Dr. Bahnsen or another apologist has more adequately defended my charges elsewhere. I am unaware of any such defense.